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Abstract—We consider a Gaussian multiple access channel
with K transmitters, a (intended) receiver and an external
eavesdropper. The transmitters wish to reliably communicate
with the receiver while concealing their messages from the
eavesdropper. This scenario has been investigated in prior works
using two different coding techniques; the random i.i.d. Gaussian
coding and the signal alignment coding. Although, the latter
offers promising results in a very high SNR regime, extending
these results to the finite SNR regime is a challenging task. In
this paper, we propose a new lattice alignment scheme based
on the compute-and-forward framework which works at any
finite SNR. We show that our achievable secure sum rate scales
with log(SNR) and hence, in most SNR regimes, our scheme
outperforms the random coding scheme in which the secure
sum rate does not grow with power. Furthermore, we show that
our result matches the prior work in the infinite SNR regime.
Additionally, we analyze our result numerically.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gaussian Multiple Access Channel (MAC) has been con-
sidered under different security scenarios. One interesting sce-
nario is the K-user Gaussian MAC with an external eavesdrop-
per in which the users wish to reliably send their messages to
the receiver while keeping them hidden from the eavesdropper.
This scenario has been investigated in [1] using the Gaussian
i.i.d. random codes. Although, these codes achieve the capacity
region of MAC without security, the result in [1] shows that
they have a poor performance in relatively high SNR regimes
when the security constraint is added. In an attempt to improve
the high SNR results, researchers investigated the problem
using the signal alignment technique. In particular, in [2] and
[3], it is shown that their proposed schemes offer a significant
improvement over the random coding counterpart in a very
high SNR regime. In fact, the scheme proposed in [3] achieves
the optimal secure Degrees of Freedom (DoF) of the K-
user Gaussian wiretap MAC. However, as these alignment
schemes use a maximum-likelihood decoder, bounding the
error probability of the decoder in the finite SNR regime
is challenging and this limits their results to the high SNR
regime.
In light of lattice alignment technique, the compute-and-
forward framework was proposed in [4] which can operate at
any finite SNR. Recently, the K-user Gaussian MAC without
security constraint has been investigated in [5] based on
lattice coding and the compute-and-forward framework. The
proposed scheme in [5] achieves the MAC sum capacity within
a constant gap and for any finite SNR.
Motivated by the above arguments, we propose a new
achievability scheme for the K-user Gaussian wiretap MAC
in which lattice alignment is used along with the asymmet-
ric compute-and-forward framework. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of our proposed scheme both analytically and numeri-
cally for any finite SNR. We prove that our proposed scheme
achieves a secure sum rate that scales with log(SNR), in
contrast to the Gaussian random coding result which does not
grow with SNR and therefore, it somehow fails at moderate
and high SNR regimes. Finally, we show that the asymptotic
behavior of our proposed scheme agrees with the prior work
result in [2] in the high SNR regime.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, our setup
preliminaries are described. Our main result is given in Section
III along with the comparison to the prior works. In Section
IV, the proof of the main result is presented. We conclude the
paper in Section V. The proof of Lemma 1 used in Section IV
is given in Appendix.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A K-user (real) Gaussian wiretap multiple access channel
(MAC) consists of K transmitters, a receiver and an external
eavesdropper. The relations between the channel inputs and
outputs are given as
y =
K∑
ℓ=1
hℓxℓ + z, yE =
K∑
ℓ=1
gℓxℓ + zE (1)
where xℓ is an N -length channel input vector of user ℓ which
satisfies the following power constraint.
‖xℓ‖2 ≤ NP, ∀ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K} (2)
The vectors y and yE in (1) are the receiver and the eaves-
dropper channel outputs, respectively. Also, z and zE are the
independent channel noises, each distributed i.i.d. according
to N (0, 1). Finally, vectors h , [h1, . . . , hK ]T and g ,
[g1, . . . , gK ]
T are real-valued vectors representing the channel
gains to the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. The
channel model is illustrated in Fig. 1.
User ℓ encodes its confidential message Wℓ, which is
uniformly distributed over the set {1, . . . , 2NRℓ} and is in-
dependent of other users’ messages, through some stochastic
mapping Eℓ, i.e., xℓ = Eℓ(Wℓ), for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. There
is also a decoder D at the receiver side which estimates the
messages, i.e., D(y) = {Wˆℓ}Kℓ=1.
Definition 1 (Achievable secure sum rate): For the
described channel model, a secure sum rate
∑K
ℓ=1Rℓ is
achievable, if for any ǫ > 0 and large enough N , there exist
a sequence of encoders {Eℓ}kℓ=1 and a decoder D such that
Pr
(
K⋃
ℓ=1
{Wˆℓ 6=Wℓ}
)
< ǫ (3)
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ ≤ 1
N
H(W1,W2, . . . ,WK |yE) + ǫ (4)
W1 E1 +
z
D1
Wˆ1
Wˆ2
.
.
.
WˆK
x1 h1 y
W2 E2
x2
WK EK +
zE
Eavesdropper
xK gK yE
.
.
.
g1
h2
g2
hK
Fig. 1: The asymmetric Gaussian wiretap multiple access channel
model.
where Pr denotes the probability of the event.1 The secure
sum capacity is the supremum of all achievable secure sum
rates.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The problem described in Section II has been treated
in [2] and [3] in the infinite SNR regime. Their proposed
schemes is based on bounding the minimum distance between
the codewords in the receiver’s effective codebook. Using
this method, they showed that the decoding error probability
tends to zero, provided that the input power goes to infinity.
In this paper, we present a new scheme which provides a
lower bound on the secure sum capacity for the same model
and for any finite value of SNR. To this end, we utilize
the compute-and-forward framework presented in [4]. More
precisely, we develop a coding scheme using an asymmetric
compute-and-forward framework to address the asymmetric
transmitter-eavesdropper channel gains, i.e., different values of
gℓ for different users. It should be noted that the asymmetric
compute-and-forward framework is also treated in [6], but here
we add the security constraint to the framework.
In the compute-and-forward framework, the receiver first
decodes K linearly independent integer combinations of the
transmitted lattice codewords and then, it solves the equations
for its desired lattice codewords.2 The equations are decoded
successively meaning that at each step k, the receiver cancels
the effect of the k−1 previously decoded codewords from the
current equation and solves it for the next codeword. The ap-
proach is similar to the Gaussian elimination with a difference
that row switching is not allowed here. This limitation is due to
the fact that a codeword cannot be eliminated from the current
equation using another equation which has not been decoded
yet. As a result, the order of canceling out the codewords
cannot be chosen arbitrarily, however, it can be shown that
there exists at least one successive cancellation order such
that all K codewords can be decoded [5].
Proposition 1: Consider an index permutation function π,
i.e., π : {1, . . . ,K} → {1, . . . ,K}, which gives a successive
1Note that in Definition 1 we are interested in weak secrecy.
2The rates are determined by how closely the equations integer coefficients
match the channel gains hℓ.
cancellation order in the compute-and-forward framework.
Also, assume that the set of linearly independent integer-
valued K-length vectors {a1, . . . , aK} be the equations coef-
ficients. Then, for the channel model in Section II, the receiver
can decode the message Wℓ ∈ {1, . . . , 2NRℓ} with a vanishing
error probability if
Rℓ ≤ Rcomb,π(ℓ) , max
(
1
2
log
(
SNRℓ
‖F aπ(ℓ)‖2
)
, 0
)
(5)
where the matrix F is given as
F ,
( 1
P
IK×K+hh
T
)−1
2 ×diag
(√
SNR1
P
, . . . ,
√
SNRK
P
)
.
The notation diag(v) stands for the diagonal matrix built from
the vector v and SNRℓ > 0 is the power used at encoder ℓ to
generate its codewords. Notice that as long as the generated
codewords are scaled properly before transmission, they would
satisfy the channel input power constraint.3
Proposition 1 is immediately deduced from applying Theo-
rem 2 along with Theorem 5 in [5] with an exception that,
here, users operate at different powers. All other conditions
stated in Theorem 5 in [5] still apply in Proposition 1.
In the following, we present a lower bound on the secure
sum capacity achieved by the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1: A rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) offers an achievable
secure sum rate for the channel model described in Section II,
if they satisfy the following constraints.
Rℓ ≥ 0, Rℓ ≤ Rcomb,π(ℓ) ∀ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K} (6)
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ ≤ max
π
Rsum (7)
where
Rsum =
(
K∑
k=2
Rcomb,k − 1
2
log
(∑K
ℓ=1 g
2
ℓ
g2
π−1(1)
))
(8)
The maximum in (7) is taken over all the possible successive
cancellation orders π and the notation π−1(.) simply denotes
the inverse permutation operator.
Proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section IV.
Comparison to the prior works
The K-user Gaussian wiretap MAC has been investigated
in [1] by means of i.i.d. Gaussian random coding. According
to [1], for the considered channel model, the following secure
sum rate is achievable
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ ≤ max
(
1
2
log
(
1 + ‖h‖2P
1 + ‖g‖2P
)
, 0
)
(9)
Note that the right hand side of expression (9) does not
scale with power P or in other words, the asymptotic behavior
of (9) tends to a constant rate for a fixed number of users
and a given set of channel gains. In contrast, our achievable
secure sum rate in (8) scales logarithmic with P . To prove
this, we only need to show that the first term in (8) grows
with log(P ) as the second term is constant with respect to
3The scaling factors can be absorbed into the the channel gains.
the power. Without loss of generality, let us assume SNRℓ =
αℓP, ∀ ℓ and some αℓ > 0 (Note that according to the earlier
discussion in Proposition 1, αℓ > 1 is allowed). Then we have,
K∑
k=1
Rcomb,k
a≥ K
2
log(P ) +
1
2
K∑
k=1
log(αk)− 1
2
log(KK |det(F)|2)
=
K
2
log(P ) +
1
2
K∑
k=1
log(αk)− K
2
(log(K) + log(P ))
+
1
2
log(1 + ‖h‖2P )− 1
2
K∑
k=1
log(αk)
=
1
2
log(1 + ‖h‖2P )− K
2
log(K) (10)
where inequality (a) is deduced from Theorem 4 in [5]. Now,
we exploit Theorem 12 in [5] in which it is shown that
Rcomb,k <
1+δ(K−1)
K+δ(K−1) .
1
2 log(P )+c, ∀ k, where the inequality
holds for any δ > 0 and some c constant with respect to P .
Therefore, if we take δ → 0 and ignore the constant terms
in (10), we have ∑Kk=2 Rcomb,k ∝ 12 .K−1K log(P ). As a result,
the secure sum rate in (8) grows with log(P ).
The numerical results are given in Fig. 2 which are evaluated
for the three-user channel and random i.i.d. (real) Gaussian
channel gains. It can be seen that for the moderate and high
SNR regimes, our proposed scheme outperforms the random
coding result presented in [1]. Notice that the achievable non-
secure results are shown in the figure as well which can be
considered as an upper bound on the secure sum rate.
Another interesting observation occurs when the channel to
the legitimate receiver is degraded with respect to the channel
to the eavesdropper. For the Gaussian setting and the same
noise power, this corresponds to the case ‖h‖ ≤ ‖g‖. In
this case, according to the expression in (9), random coding
fails to achieve a positive secure sum rate, while our scheme
achieves a strictly positive secure sum rate as long as the ratios
hℓ
gℓ
are not rational.4 To illustrate this observation, we ran an
experiment on a two-user Gaussian wiretap MAC with a fixed
power (at SNR= 25dB) in which the channel gains are given
as
h =
[
1,
√
2
]T
, g =
[√
3 cos(θ),
√
3 sin(θ)
]T
(11)
for some random θ uniformly distributed over [0, 2π]. This is
an example of the case where ‖h‖ = ‖g‖. Fig. 3 shows that
as long as the ratios of hℓ
gℓ
are not rational, a positive secure
sum rate can be attained following our scheme.
At last, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the
expression (8). We show that our scheme achieves a total
secure DoF of K−1
K
. Earlier, to prove the scalability of (8)
with log(P ), we showed that the Rsum is proportional to
1
2 .
K−1
K
log(P ), provided that the constant terms are ignored.
Therefore,
lim
P→∞
Rsum
1
2 log (1 + P )
=
K − 1
K
(12)
4It can be shown that the Lebesgue measure of such rational ratios is small.
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Thus, the asymptotic behavior of the proposed scheme agrees
with the result in [2]. In fact, we can further improve the
presented scheme so that its asymptotic behavior reaches the
optimal secure degrees of freedom given in [3]. The latter is
aimed to be presented in the extended version.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we use notions and properties related to the
lattice coding and nested lattice structure which are discussed
in detail in the seminal work by Erez and Zamir in [7]. Due to
the space limitation, we avoid discussing the previously known
results in this paper and we focus on the new results. Our pro-
posed scheme provides security by confusing the eavesdropper
through aligning the codewords at the eavesdropper side such
that it can only decode the subsets of the codewords which
have the same sum values in RN . To this end, each encoded
codeword x˜ at transmitter ℓ is scaled before the transmission
by a factor of 1
gℓ
, i.e., xℓ = x˜ℓgℓ , so that the eavesdropper
receives the sum of the codewords x˜ as its channel output,
i.e., yE =
∑K
ℓ=1 x˜ + zE . Consequently, user ℓ generates
its codewords x˜ using power of SNRℓ , g2ℓP so that the
transmitted codewords xℓ satisfy the power constraint in (2).
As it was mentioned earlier, to address the problem of users
with different powers, we utilize the asymmetric compute-and-
forward framework along with a nested lattice structure. In our
asymmetric compute-and-forward framework, user ℓ generates
a sequence of n-length lattice codewords tℓ using a pair of
fine and coarse lattice sets as (Λf,ℓ,Λℓ). The coarse lattice Λℓ
is scaled such that its second moment equals to the available
power at user ℓ, i.e., SNRℓ = g2ℓP . Also, we impose a nested
structure on the users’ lattice pairs as
ΛK ⊆ ΛK−1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Λ1 ⊆ Λf,K ⊆ · · · ⊆ Λf,1 (13)
In the rest of the proof, we shall assume π(ℓ) = ℓ, ∀ ℓ in (8).
If that is not the case, we can simply re-index the users indices
and define a nested structure as in (13) for the re-indexed users.
User ℓ constructs its codebook in three steps. The first step
for user ℓ is to construct its inner codebook Lℓ , Λf,ℓ ∩ Vℓ,
where Vℓ is the fundamental Voronoi region of the coarse
lattice Λℓ. The ratio between the coarse and the fine lattices
is set such that Lℓ consists of 2nRcomb,ℓ inner codewords tℓ,
i.e., Rcomb,ℓ = 1n log
∣∣Λf,ℓ ∩ Vℓ∣∣, ∀ ℓ. The inner codewords
tℓ have a uniform distribution over Lℓ.
In the second step, user ℓ builds its outer codebook by
generating B i.i.d. copies of the inner codewords tℓ, for some
large enough B. Let us denote the outer codewords as t¯ℓ.
Then we have t¯ℓ , [t[1]ℓ , . . . , t
[B]
ℓ ]. Note that each t
[i]
ℓ is
independently and uniformly distributed over Lℓ. It is worth
to mention that the outer code is added only for technicality
reasons in the proof of Lemma 2 in [8] and it does not
increase secrecy. Also, adding the outer layer to the codebook
changes the block length of the overall codewords from n to
N , B × n.
Finally, in the third step, the wiretap codebook is built.
To this end, user ℓ partitions the outer codewords t¯ℓ into
2NRℓ equal-size bins and randomly assigns each index wℓ ∈
{1, . . . , 2NRℓ} to exactly one bin. Rates Rℓ are chosen
such that they satisfy (6) and ∑Kℓ=1Rℓ = ∑Kℓ=2Rcomb,ℓ −
1
2 log
(∑
ℓ g
2
ℓ
g2
1
)
+ ǫ1, for some small ǫ1 > 0. Also, user ℓ has
a random dither d[i]ℓ for each block i, which is independently
generated according to a uniform distribution over Vℓ. Dithers
are public and do not increase secrecy.5
To send a message Wℓ = wℓ, user ℓ randomly picks a
codeword t¯ℓ from the corresponding bin and dithers it. Then,
it scales the resulting codeword by the factor of 1
gℓ
. The signal
transmitted by user ℓ is
xℓ
△
=
1
gℓ
([
t¯ℓ + d¯ℓ
]
mod Λℓ
) (14)
Note that in (14) the modular operation is done block-wise,
meaning that for i ∈ {1, . . . , B} the signal transmitted at
block i is 1
gℓ
([t
[i]
ℓ + d
[i]
ℓ ] mod Λℓ).
Proof of secrecy
In this subsection, we bound the eavesdropper’s equivoca-
tion rate. Without loss of generality, let us assume Rcomb,ℓ >
0, ∀ ℓ. We have
1
N
H(W1, . . . ,WK
∣∣yE , d¯1, . . . , d¯K)
≥ 1
N
H(t¯1, . . . , t¯K
∣∣yE , d¯1, . . . , d¯K)
− 1
N
H(t¯1, . . . , t¯K
∣∣W1, . . . ,WK ,yE , d¯1, . . . , d¯K)
(a)
≥ 1
N
H(t¯1, . . . , t¯K
∣∣yE , d¯1, . . . , d¯K)− 2ǫ2
≥ 1
N
H(t¯1, . . . , t¯K
∣∣yE , d¯1, . . . , d¯K , zE)− 2ǫ2
(b)
=
1
N
H
(
t¯1, . . . , t¯K
∣∣∣∣
K∑
ℓ=1
gℓxℓ, d¯1, . . . , d¯K
)
− 2ǫ2
5As the average leakage rate (w.r.t. dithers) goes to zero, there must exist
a sequence of deterministic dithers for which the leakage rate goes to zero.
(c)
=
1
N
H
(
t¯1, . . . , t¯K
∣∣∣∣
[
K∑
ℓ=1
t¯ℓ
]
mod Λ1, u¯1, d¯1, . . . , d¯K
)
− 2ǫ2
(d)
=
1
N
H
(
t¯2, . . . , t¯K
∣∣∣∣
[
K∑
ℓ=1
t¯ℓ
]
mod Λ1, u¯1, d¯1, . . . , d¯K
)
− 2ǫ2
(e)
≥ 1
N
H
(
t¯2, . . . , t¯K
∣∣∣∣
[
K∑
ℓ=1
t¯ℓ
]
mod Λ1
)
− 1
N
H(u¯1)− 2ǫ2
(f)
=
1
N
H(t¯2, . . . , t¯K)− 1
N
H(u¯1)− 2ǫ2
(g)
=
B
N
K∑
ℓ=2
nRcomb,ℓ − B
N
H(u
[1]
1 )− 2ǫ2
(h)
≥
K∑
ℓ=2
Rcomb,ℓ − (1− ǫ)1
2
log
(∑K
ℓ=1 g
2
ℓ + ǫ
g21
)
− δ(ǫ)− 2ǫ2
≥
K∑
ℓ=2
Rcomb,ℓ − 1
2
log
(∑K
ℓ=1 g
2
ℓ
g21
)
− ǫ
g21
− δ(ǫ)− 2ǫ2
(i)
=
K∑
ℓ=2
Rcomb,ℓ − 1
2
log
(∑K
ℓ=1 g
2
ℓ
g21
)
− ǫ3 (15)
In the above inequalities, (a) is deduced from applying the
packing lemma to the outer codewords (detailed proof of this
step is provided in Appendix of [8]). (b) is true since after
subtracting the noise from yE , the remaining random vectors
become independent of the noise. (c) is true since Λ1 is the
densest lattice among the lattices (Λ1,Λ2, . . . ,ΛK), according
to the nested structure in (13). Therefore,[
K∑
ℓ=1
gℓxℓ −
K∑
ℓ=1
d¯ℓ
]
mod Λ1 =
[
K∑
ℓ=1
t¯ℓ
]
mod Λ1.
Also, notice that
H
(
K∑
ℓ=1
gℓxℓ
)
= H
([
K∑
ℓ=1
gℓxℓ
]
mod Λ1, u¯1
)
,
where u¯1
△
=
∑K
ℓ=1 gℓxℓ −
[∑K
ℓ=1 gℓxℓ
]
mod Λ1. Inequality
(d) is due to the reason that the codeword t¯1 can be obtained
from the modulo-sum
[∑K
ℓ=1 t¯ℓ
]
mod Λ1 and the sequence of
codewords t¯2, . . . , t¯K . (e) holds since dithers are independent
of the codewords and conditioning reduces entropy. (f) is
deduced from Lemma 2 in [9] (Crypto lemma), which implies
that for each block i ∈ [1, B],
[
t
[i]
1 +
∑K
ℓ=2 t
[i]
ℓ
]
mod Λ1 has
uniform distribution over the codebook L1 and is independent
of
∑K
ℓ=2 t
[i]
ℓ . (g) is true since
∣∣Lℓ∣∣ = 2nRcomb,ℓ and for
i ∈ {1, . . . , B}, inner codewords t[i]ℓ have i.i.d. uniform
distribution over Lℓ, ∀ ℓ. Also, u¯1 consists of B i.i.d. copies
of u[i]1 by its definition. (h) follows from applying Lemma 1
in Appendix to u[1]1 , and finally, (i) is deduced by defining
ǫ3 , δ(ǫ) +
ǫ
g2
1
+ 2ǫ2. Thus, the condition in (4) is satisfied
and the proof of secrecy is completed.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a security scheme built on the
asymmetric compute-and-forward framework, which works at
any finite SNR. The achievable secure sum rate presented in
our scheme scales with log(SNR) and therefore, it signifi-
cantly outperforms the existing random coding result for the
most SNR regimes. Our presented scheme also achieves a total
secure DoF of K−1
K
. This result can be furthered improved to
achieve the optimal secure DoF which is aimed to be presented
in our future work.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1: Consider a set of n-dimensional lattices
Λ1, . . . ,ΛK with their fundamental Voronoi regions as
V1, . . . ,VK , respectively. Assume that all the lattices are
scaled such that their second moments equal to SNRℓ =
g2ℓP, ∀ ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where P > 0. Now construct random
vectors uj , for j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, as uj , QΛj
(∑K
ℓ=1 sℓ
)
,
where s1, . . . , sK are independent n-dimensional random vec-
tors uniformly distributed over V1, . . . ,VK , respectively, and
the operation QΛj (.) is the nearest neighbor quantizer with
respect to the lattice Λj . Then, for all ǫ > 0 and sufficiently
large n, the entropy of uj is bounded as
1
n
H(uj) ≤ (1− ǫ)1
2
log
(∑K
ℓ=1 g
2
ℓ + ǫ
g2j
)
+ δ(ǫ) ∀j (16)
where δ(ǫ) tends to zero as ǫ→ 0.
Proof: According to Lemma 1, uj is the output of the lattice
quantizer QΛj , so it can only take discrete values. To bound
the entropy of uj , first we bound the range of ‖
∑K
ℓ=1 sℓ‖ as
follows. Let rcov,ℓ denote the covering radius of Λℓ, i.e., the
radius of the smallest ball containing the Voronoi region Vℓ.
Also, let reff,ℓ denote the radius of the sphere which has
the same volume as the volume of Vℓ, i.e., Vol(B(reff,ℓ)) =
Vol(Vℓ). Now, consider K (n-dimensional) balls whose sec-
ond moments per dimension equal to σ21 , σ22 , . . . , σ2K and their
radii are given as rcov,1, rcov,2, . . . , rcov,K , respectively. Next,
for each ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, consider a random vector bℓ with
the uniform distribution over an n-dimensional ball B(rcov,ℓ).
Recall that a ball has the smallest normalized second moment
for a given volume [7]. Therefore, we have
g2ℓP =
1
n
E‖sℓ‖2
≥ 1
n
E
∥∥∥∥
(
reff,ℓ
rcov,ℓ
)
bℓ
∥∥∥∥
2
=
(
reff,ℓ
rcov,ℓ
)2
σ2ℓ , ∀ ℓ (17)
Now, consider a random vector zeq ,
∑K
ℓ=1 zℓ, in which
random vectors zℓ are i.i.d. according to the distribu-
tion N (0, σ2ℓ I) and therefore, zeq ∼ N (0, σ2eqI). Then,
from (17) we have σ2zeq =
∑K
ℓ=1 σ
2
ℓ ≤
∑K
ℓ=1
(
rcov,ℓ
reff,ℓ
)2
g2ℓP .
Now, using Lemma 11 in [7], we conclude that
eK.n.c(n)fzeq (zeq) = e
K.n.c(n) (fz1(zeq) ∗ ... ∗ fzK (zeq))
≥ f∑K
ℓ=1
sℓ
(zeq) (18)
where n.c(n) goes to zero as n goes to infinity. Notice
that in deriving (18) we also used the fact that vectors sℓ
are independent vectors, and hence, pdf of their sum is the
convolution of their individual pdfs. Now we can bound the
range of ‖∑Kℓ=1 sℓ‖ as follows. For any ǫ > 0,
Pr
(∥∥ K∑
ℓ=1
sℓ
∥∥ 6∈ B (√nσ2zeq + nǫ)
)
(a)
≤ eK.n.c(n)Pr
(
‖zeq‖ 6∈ B
(√
nσ2zeq + nǫ
))
≤ ǫ.
Inequality (a) follows from (18) and non-negativity of the ℓ2-
norm. Also, the last inequality is deduced from the Weak Law
of Large numbers (WLL) for sufficiently large n. Since we
showed that
∥∥∑K
ℓ=1 sℓ
∥∥ belongs to the ball B(√nσ2zeq + nǫ)
with probability 1− ǫ, it only remains to find an upper bound
on the number of non-intersecting Voronoi regions Vj which
fit in this ball, i.e.,
V ol
(
B
(√
nσ2zeq + nǫ
))
V ol (Vj) =
V ol
(
B
(√
nσ2zeq + nǫ
))
V ol (B(reff,j))
(a)
≤
(
nσ2zeq + nǫ(
reff,j
rcov,j
)2
ng2jP
)n
2 (b)
≤
(∑K
ℓ=1
(
rcov,ℓ
reff,ℓ
)2
g2ℓ + ǫ(
reff,j
rcov,j
)2
g2j
)n
2
,
where inequality (a) is concluded from Lemma 6 in [7] and
inequality (b) follows from (17). Finally, recall that for a high
dimensional good lattices, we have log
(
rcov,ℓ
reff,ℓ
)
→ 0 [7].
Therefore,
1
n
H(uj) ≤ (1− ǫ)1
2
log
(∑K
ℓ=1 g
2
ℓ + ǫ
g2j
)
+ δ(ǫ).
Note that using WLL, the term δ(ǫ) tends zero as n goes to
infinity. This completes the proof. 
